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Abstract
In the first year of the new century, over a million American women officially entered the ranks of “the elderly” by reaching their 65th birth­
day (U.Sl Bureau of the Census, 1999). What can they expect of government policy? To what extent will the nation’s economic support sys­
tems respond to their needs? And what about their daughters’ and their babies’? This article considers two broad social trends that determine 
public policy responses to the needs of the elderly: shifting fertility patterns and labor force participation of women. The implications of these 
trends for income security in old age are considered, followed by recommendations for new approaches to family policy in the United States 
The article closes by suggesting that in the 21 st century Social Security should be for babies
SOCIAL SECURITY IS NOT FOR BABIES in three 
ways: First, Social Security is a complex policy. Under­
standing it requires thought and study. Second, in the 
United States, Social Security does not reward or support 
women who have children. Indeed, the issue of declining 
fertility is rarely broached in the public debate on Social 
Security. Third, current Social Security policy in the U.S. 
does not support children themselves. The most power­
ful anti-poverty strategy ever applied in this country does 
not serve the population most at risk of poverty: the na­
tion’s children.
This article uses a target cohort, women born in 
1935, to survey trends and policies that influence the in­
come security of older women in the United States. It ex­
amines 2 0 th century fertility rates to reveal an enduring 
trend towards lower fertility. The movement of women 
into the job market is introduced as another enduring 
trend that must be taken into account in attempts to se­
cure adequate retirement income for women. Two key 
sources of retirement income, Social Security and private 
pensions, are examined for their impact on women and 
women’s risk of poverty in late life. Reform proposals, 
and the politics of crisis are considered in the next sec­
tion, where the notion of “intergenerational conflict” is 
introduced, and privatization of Social Security is con­
sidered. Pension and Social Security reforms that offer
opportunities to enhance women’s income security are 
introduced. Finally, the article argues that the real crisis 
in social security will come, not from the baby boom, 
but from declining fertility and the nation’s failure to in­
vest in children.
The Target Cohort
Women who turned sixty-five in 2000 were born in 
1935, as was the nation’s Social Security System. These 
women were a relatively small cohort. Many of them be­
came mothers of the baby boomers who followed. Most 
of them married, and the vast majority had babies (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1950). Their reproductive 
choices included oral contraceptives, but legal abortions 
were not available until 1973, when they were 38 years 
old. Most (about 70%) of them finished high school, but 
few finished college (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1991a). 
They worked outside the home in greater numbers than 
any previous generation. Their middle adulthood (35­
45) was marked by a gas crisis, and “stagflation.” (The 
novel combination of economic stagnation and infla­
tion.) Their peak earning years (45-55) occurred during 
the Reagan Revolution. A few retired early, but most of 
those who worked will retire after age 65, in the first few 
years of the 2 1 st century, a time of crisis for the program
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that came into the world with them: Social Security.
Two broad social trends have colored the life experi­
ences of this cohort: shifting fertility rates and women’s 
labor force participation. These trends have significant im­
plications for policies and programs that serve the elderly.
Shifting Fertility
The target cohort was born when U.S. fertility rates 
hit a historic low. In 1935, 77.2 live births were record­
ed for every 1,000 women of childbearing years (16-44) 
in the population (National Center for Health Statistics, 
1998). Most demographers explain this with reference to 
the Great Depression. It was clearly not a time when 
families could afford children. This created a pent-up de­
mand for children that was manifest in the baby boom 
that accompanied the post-World War II economic re­
covery. The baby boom was followed in the 1970s by a 
new and perhaps more enduring demographic reality -  
the “baby bust.” U.S. fertility rates appear to have stabi­
lized at levels well below any that were observed in ear­
lier decades. These fertility trends are illustrated in Fig­
ure 1, below.
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Trends in the elderly population mirror these fertility 
trends. So, while many members of our target cohort 
reached 65 in 2000, those born during the peak years of 
U.S. fertility, 1955 - 1960, will turn 65 in 2020-2025. The 
baby boom has dominated social policy for the elderly, 
just as it once dominated educational policy in the U.S.
Labor Force Participation
Women who turned 65 in 2000 entered the labor 
force in unprecedented numbers. So did their daughters. 
Indeed, one of the most striking social trends of the 20th 
century was increased labor force participation of 
women. This is illustrated in Figure 2, below. As the fig­
ure also indicates, prior to 1975, a much higher propor­
tion of African-American women were involved in paid 
employment (Hayghe, 1997; Smith & Bachu, 1999).
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*Source: Smith & Bachu, 1999; U.S. Department of Commerce, 1935-1990
Their increased labor force participation will have a 
minimal effect on our target cohort’s retirement income. 
Its impact on their daughters’ income security will be 
mitigated by continuing occupational segregation in the 
U.S. labor market, as well as the gender gap in wages.
O ccupational Segregation. Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employ­
ment on the basis of sex. Nonetheless, gender segrega­
tion continues to permeate the U.S. labor market. A ma­
jority of both white women and women of color work 
in a narrow range of service and clerical occupations 
(U.S. Dept. of Labor, 2000). Women continue to be pre­
dominantly employed in clerical and service occupa­
tions, jobs that bring neither competitive wages nor pri­
vate pension coverage.
Wages. The gender gap in wages has persisted as 
long as women have been in paid employment. It once 
enjoyed official sanction, as for example when the feder­
al government established a classification for clerk typ­
ists in 1867. Within this classification, women received 
$600 per year, and men, $1,200 (Simpson, 1985). The 
Civil Rights Act outlawed this practice. Nonetheless, in
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1999,  median earnings for women who worked full-time 
year-round were only 77% of the median earnings for 
men (U.S. Dept. of Labor, 2000).
In the 21st century, the wage differential may have 
less impact than it did in the 20 th. The last few decades 
of the 20th century saw it shrink considerably. In 1973, 
women who were employed full-time made only 57% of 
men’s wages. As the above figure for 1999 indicates, by 
the century’s close, employed women made approxi­
mately 77% of men’s wages (U.S. Dept. of Labor, 2000). 
Younger women, the granddaughters of the target co­
hort, are closer to wage parity than any previous gener­
ation of women. In 1999, women under the age of 25 
who were employed full-time earned 91% of similarly 
situated men (U.S. Dept. of Labor, 2000).
Nonetheless, the wage gap is a significant concern 
for women in our target cohort and their daughters. A 
lifetime of low wages results in what Crystal and Shea 
(1990) called “cumulative disadvantage.” This disad­
vantage is not corrected in policies governing Americans’ 
primary sources of retirement income: Social Security, 
and private pensions.
Social Security and Women
As originally formulated, the Social Security system 
offered little to women who were not in the labor force. 
Dependent and survivor benefits were added to the pro­
gram in 1939. In 1965 the rising rate of marital dissolu­
tion was recognized, and amendments passed that grant­
ed benefits to divorcees who had been married for at 
least 25 years. Twelve years later, in 1977, benefits were 
granted to those married at least 1 0 years (Achenbaum, 
1986). So, by the time our target cohort was 42 years 
old, Social Security was prepared to support them in 
four roles: as a single worker, as the dependent of a 
worker, as the survivor of a worker, and as the divorcee 
of a worker. The system was not then, and is not now, 
supportive of dual-worker couples.
Wives in dual-worker couples face a choice. They 
can receive benefits based on their earnings, or they can 
receive benefits as dependents. They cannot do both. 
Those who left the labor force to raise children or care for 
the sick, and those whose wages were lower than their 
spouses’ receive more as dependents than on the basis of 
their own work histories. So they receive no benefit for 
the payroll taxes withheld from every one of their pay­
checks. (See Schultz, 1995.) Indeed, if their employment
reduced their husbands’ wages (for example, by limiting 
his promotions or geographic mobility) they may find 
that a lifetime of work is a disadvantage in old age.
Members of the target cohort may be upset when 
they encounter this quirk in the nation’s social insurance. 
Their granddaughters are likely to be furious! With in­
creased labor force participation, rising payroll taxes, 
and a trend toward more egalitarian marriages, these 
younger women will pay an even higher price for the sys­
tem’s failure to recognize their workforce contributions. 
Several proposals have surfaced in recent years to ad­
dress this issue. One of the most promising is the idea of 
“earnings sharing.”
Under earnings sharing proposals, Social Security 
earnings credits of married couples would be divided 
equally between the spouses for the length of the mar­
riage. Earnings sharing proposals were given serious 
consideration by the National Commission on Social Se­
curity. In 1981 the Commission concluded that the mea­
sure would erode the adequacy of the program by low­
ering the benefits of many women. Those disadvantaged 
were primarily widows without work histories who, 
under current law, are entitled to two-thirds, rather than 
half, of their husbands’ retirement benefits. In contrast, 
the U.S. House of Representatives later issued a lengthy 
analysis suggesting adjustments in a basic earnings shar­
ing program that would address the adequacy concerns 
raised by the Commission (U.S. House of Representa­
tives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1985). Earnings 
sharing would benefit divorcees who had less than 10 
years of marriage, giving them credit for their hus- 
bands’(or wives’) earnings. It would also eliminate the 
inequities experienced by dual-career marriages. As these 
two groups grow in numbers relative to dependents 
without work histories the likelihood of some form of 
earnings sharing increases (see Fierst & Duff, 1988).
Private Pensions and Women
Where 90% of older Americans receive income from 
Social Security, only 44% receive income from private 
pensions (U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services,
1992). Nonetheless, private pensions represent a signifi­
cant public investment. Favorable tax treatment of 
money placed in pension funds is consistently one of the 
nation’s top tax expenditures (Joint Committee on Tax­
ation, 1998; OMB, 1999). So pensions might be reason­
ably expected to serve broad social goals.
1Noting that the gender gap in wages is minimal among African Americans, O’Grady- LeShane (1995) suggested that earnings sharing may not substantially 
benefit African American
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Women consistently receive fewer pension benefits 
than men. In today’s cohort of elderly, men are about 
twice as likely as women to receive private pension in­
come (Woods, 1988). This gender differential is greatest 
among older workers, but is present throughout the 
labor force (Korczyk, 1993). Some explain this gap by 
noting that clerical and service positions that women are 
most likely to occupy are those least likely to offer pen­
sion coverage. But Korczyk (1993) argued that, “Based 
on all characteristics other than earnings, women are still 
less likely to be covered by pensions than similarly situ­
ated men.” (p. 28). In her analysis, the gap persisted 
among men and women who were similarly situated 
with respect to job tenure, industry, union membership, 
age, occupation, and firm size. Korczyk concluded that, 
“women’s pension coverage lags behind that of men 
largely because the labor market treats women different­
ly from men.” (p. 32).
In our target cohort, some women who were cov­
ered by pensions paid more than men, and/or earned 
lower benefits—simply because of their gender. Until 
1983, both contributions and benefits under a private 
pension plan were computed based on gender. Women 
were required to contribute more and/or receive lower 
benefits because, on average, they live longer than men. 
This practice, which Gohmann & McClure (1987) de­
scribed as “economically logical” is now illegal. In two 
decisions made in 1978 and 1983, the Supreme Court 
ruled that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibited the 
use of gender in determining contributions or benefits 
(City of Los Angeles, Dept of Water & Power v. Marie 
Manhart; Arizona Governing Committee for Tax De­
ferred Annuity and deferred Compensation Plans v. 
Nathalie Norris).
A minority of the women in our target cohort have 
pension coverage based on their own employment. But 
those who are or were married may expect to be covered 
as dependents and survivors. Prior to 1974, wives of 
workers whose plans offered survivor benefits could be 
deprived of their benefits without their knowledge or con­
sent. The 1974 passage of the Employee Retirement In­
come Security Act (ERISA) and subsequent pension re­
forms have eliminated this practice. Pension plans must 
now offer employees the opportunity to choose a “joint 
and survivor option,” in which payments are made to sur­
vivors. This option must be provided at the time of retire­
ment, and a spouse must give “knowing consent” when 
the worker elects to forego the survivor annuity. Couples 
who choose to receive joint and survivor coverage take a 
reduction in their monthly retirement income in exchange
for coverage that extends through both life spans.
Unfortunately, women who can least afford to live 
without survivor protection are most likely to give up 
their survivor benefits in favor of increased income dur­
ing the lives of their spouses. In 1989, only 45% of those 
with the lowest pension income (median of $354 per 
month) elected survivor coverage. This compares to 60% 
of those with mid-level incomes (median of $598 per 
month) and 74% of those with the highest pension in­
come (median over $1,000 per month (U.S. GAO, 1992).
Thus, both Social Security (the nation’s most effec­
tive anti-poverty strategy) and private pensions (one of 
the nation’s biggest “hidden” expenditures) leave many 
women at risk of poverty in their later years.
Poverty and Older Women
We usually think of the “feminization of poverty” as 
a concern for younger women. Yet gender is a greater 
predictor of poverty in old age than in earlier years (Bar- 
usch, 1994). Among children, the risk (while unaccept- 
ably high) is evenly distributed across the genders. But
Table 1: G ender D ifferences in Poverty R isk by Age*
AGE WOMEN MEN RATIO
(women/mi
Under 18 years 20% 21% 1.0
18-24 20% 14% 1.4
25-34 16% 10% 1.6
35-44 10% 8% 1.3
45-54 9% 7% 1.3
55-64 11% 8% 1.4
65-74 13% 8% 1.6
75+ 19% 9% 2.1
* Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1991
once Americans reach adulthood a gender difference in 
poverty rates emerges, and this differential increases 
with advanced age. This is illustrated in Table 1.
The ratio of men to women in poverty is a useful mea­
sure of the gender gap. As Table 1 indicates, the gap in­
creases with age. In 1990 this ratio doubled from child­
hood (1.0) to advanced old age (2.1). These figures 
illustrate the impact of women’s cumulative disadvantage. 
A review of recent trends indicates that the gender gap in 
poverty risk among the elderly has increased since 1970. In
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1970 the ratio for those 65 and older was 1.5; in 1980 it 
increased to 1.7; and by 1990 it had grown to 2.0 (Bar- 
usch, 1994). If risk of poverty is any indication, the cumu­
lative disadvantage experienced by women has increased.
By international standards, American women face an 
unusually high risk of poverty in old age. A 1993 study 
of Western industrialized nations concluded, “The Unit­
ed States has everywhere the highest elderly poverty rates 
of the countries studied.” (Smeeding, et al., 1993, p. 7). 
This poverty is experienced primarily by single, older 
women. Single older women in the United States had the 
highest poverty rate (17.6%). Other nations did not even 
come close, with the following poverty rates for single 
older women: Canada, 3.2%; Australia, 3.8%; Germany, 
2.4%; Sweden, 1.7%; United Kingdom, 0.4%; the 
Netherlands 0.0% ; and France, 0.8% (Smeeding, et al.,
1993). Vulnerable older women in the United States have 
also been ignored, if not victimized, by political rhetoric 
that blames the elderly for rising poverty among children.
Divisive Politics
Most Americans believe that the baby boom created 
a crisis in Social Security—a crisis that could result in 
“intergenerational war.” The phrase “intergenerational 
conflict” has become a catchword for political commen­
tators who argue that “greedy geezers” have taken up 
more than their share of public resources through Social 
Security and America’s youth have suffered as a result.
This argument is not put forward by advocates for 
children, but by an elite group of political and business 
leaders (Kingson & Quadagno, 1997). In 1984, Senator 
Dave Durenberger (R-MN) founded an organization 
called “Americans for Generational Equity (AGE).” This 
organization’s goal was, “to promote the concept of gen­
erational equity among America’s political, intellectual 
and financial leaders” (Quadagno, 1990). Financial sup­
port for AGE came primarily from “banks, insurance 
companies, defense contractors, and health care corpo­
rations.” (Quadagno, 1990). With that support the or­
ganization mounted an effective propaganda campaign 
to persuade voters that the elderly had robbed children 
of their economic futures.
Although AGE no longer exists, its banner has been 
picked up by groups like the Concord Coalition and the 
“Third Millenium.” The Concord Coalition was funded 
by Pete Peterson (Chair of President Clinton’s Tax and 
Entitlement Reform Commission), and supports privati­
zation of Social Security. The “Third Millenium” is a 
group of about 1,700 members that claims to represent
the interests of younger workers or “Generation X.” In 
the early 1990s, they organized a widely-cited poll that 
reported that more young Americans believe in flying 
saucers than in the future of Social Security. (See 
McLeod, 1995.) Faced with flying saucers and intergen- 
erational warfare, many Americans are willing to risk 
privatization of Social Security.
Risky Ventures
Most Americans either hope or believe that a free 
market, left unchecked, will provide the best possible life 
for the largest possible number. With its roots in liber­
tarianism, American political and economic philosophy 
is loath to acknowledge market failures, or the need for 
social insurance. With the end of the 20th century this 
long-standing philosophical position is stronger than 
ever. Americans saw the end of the Cold War as a victo­
ry for capitalism. The fall of the Soviet regime, coupled 
with raging growth in the U.S. economy and rising stock 
prices created an excess of faith in the free market.
This is fertile ground for proposals to “privatize” 
Social Security. Privatization simply means moving some 
or all of the money in the social security trust fund into 
the equity (or stock) market. In 1979, Jose Pinera, then 
labor minister of Chile, oversaw the final stages of “pri­
vatizing” that nation’s pension system. With the end of 
his term in Chile’s government, Mr. Pinera came to the 
United States to Co-Chair a project funded by the Cato 
Institute to promote privatizing the U.S. social security 
system. Their efforts persuaded President Clinton to in­
clude partial privatization of social security in his 1999 
State of the Union Address.
Opposition to privatization came from a surprising 
source when Alan Greenspan, Chair of the Federal Re­
serve Board testified before the Senate Banking Com­
mittee in 1999. Greenspan argued that it would be im­
possible to keep politics out of the stock market if huge 
amounts of public funds were invested there by the So­
cial Security system. In essence, he suggested that a 
dominant public presence in the market could reduce 
its efficiency and diminish returns—not only negating 
the supposed benefits of privatization, but weakening 
the market as a whole. The recent volatility of the stock 
market seems to have moderated enthusiasm for priva­
tization by providing an object lesson in the risks of 
private investment.
In addition to the risk involved, privatization signif­
icantly complicates the administration of Social Security.
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If individuals are to enjoy a measure of discretion in the 
investment of their social security funds, they will need 
access to brokers and investment counselors. Inevitably 
these professionals will require compensation for their 
services. While this may prove profitable for some sec­
tors of the economy, the increased administrative costs 
may absorb most or all of the increased return from pri­
vate investment.
Is There a Social Security Crisis?
In the face of long-term demographic trends the So­
cial Security crisis changes colors. It is not an impending 
crisis of excess fertility, but is best characterized as an en­
during problem of declining fertility. The long-term prob­
lem is not the daughters of the target cohort, but their 
grand-daughters—or rather the lack thereof. Most de­
mographers consider the baby boom a brief aberration in 
a long-term trend of declining fertility. This trend has 
been observed throughout the industrialized world, and 
seems the inevitable result of social and economic devel­
opment. Declining fertility leaves a nation with fewer 
workers, a situation that is problematic for “pay-as-you- 
go” programs like the U.S. Social Security system.
The term, “pay as you go” means that today’s work­
ers support today’s retirees. Most of the revenue collect­
ed through payroll taxes is used to pay for the benefits 
of current recipients. The remainder goes into reserve or 
“trust funds.” Until the early 1980s revenue matched 
benefits paid at approximately $2 0 0  billion per year. 
Since the amendments authored by the 1981 National 
Commission on Social Security Reform, the trust funds 
have been accumulating reserves at a rate of approxi­
mately $242 million per day, so at the end of 1997 the 
funds held a balance of approximately $656 billion. (So­
cial Security Administration, 1998).
Long-term projections suggest that, despite today’s 
surplus, the OASI trust fund will begin to show a rev­
enue shortfall in the first half of this century. That is, 
benefit payments will exceed the amount collected 
through payroll taxes—assuming no change in either 
taxes or benefits. Two factors suggest that the U.S. Social 
Security system is not in crisis: mortality and the size of 
the deficit.
Current projections estimate the OASI trust fund 
will remain solvent until 2037—the year the peak of 
baby boomers turn 82. Contrary to the current “crisis 
mentality,” and no doubt to their own wishes, baby 
boomers will not prove to be the nation’s first generation
of immortals. Their numbers should begin to diminish 
even as the trust fund begins to go into the red.
In absolute dollars, the projected deficit sounds huge. 
But it amounts to approximately 2.2 percent of projected 
payroll taxes. That is, an increase of 2.2 percentage points 
in the payroll tax (from 12.4% of earnings to 14.6%) 
could restore the system’s solvency. Of course, such an in­
crease is both politically and morally repugnant.
H aving ruled out pr ivatization and raising the p ay- 
roll tax, what source might Americans use to cover the 
projected (short-term) deficit in Social Security? General 
revenues? The notion that Social Security can only be fi­
nanced through worker contributions, like the idea of in- 
tergenerational warfare, is a uniquely American com­
modity. Several European nations have used sources 
such as individual and corporate income taxes to finance 
retirement benefits. Unlike the payroll tax, these are pro­
gressive taxes — their burden is born by the affluent who 
are most able to pay them. Americans have used general 
revenues to finance wars, (even some that didn’t, offi­
cially, exist). Particular in times of budget surplus, these 
revenues should be used to underwrite the retirement of 
baby boomers.
Beyond the Crisis
The “pseudo crisis” in Social Security has distracted 
American policymakers from the long-term challenge of 
ameliorating and preventing poverty in old age. Pension 
and Social Security reforms offer significant opportuni­
ties to address these goals.
Pension Reforms
Women and low-wage workers continue to be dis­
advantaged by private pensions, and reform efforts face 
stiff opposition from business interests. Policymakers 
and advocates must recognize the public’s interest in pri­
vate pensions. The nation subsidizes pension funds 
through forgone taxes, and has a right to demand that 
social goals be served by this subsidy.
Today, small businesses enjoy tax exemption for 
pension systems that only cover owners and key em­
ployees. Further, vesting requirements under ERISA 
leave many workers in “covered” employment without 
pensions. The trend toward part-time and contract em­
ployment effectively rules out pension coverage for a 
growing segment of the labor force. Finally, many
2Projections related to this shortfall are periodically adjusted. The system was expected to be insolvent around 2035. In 1999 that date was pushed back by 
approximately two years,
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women remain unaware of the consequences of giving 
up their joint and survivor annuities. Legislative and ed­
ucational efforts might address these deficiencies and sig­
nificantly reduce the poverty risk of future generations of 
older women. At a minimum, educational programs 
such as a recent effort by the U.S. Administration on 
Aging, are needed to inform workers of their pension 
rights and of the implications of decisions to forgo joint 
and survivor annuities. Other more powerful reforms 
should expand private pension coverage.
Social Security Reforms
Privatization has been advanced as a fundamental 
reform of Social Security. Its popularity reflects belief in 
a Social Security crisis, as well as the resurgence of capi­
talist philosophy. Its advocates promise that placing So­
cial Security funds in the private market will increase re­
turns. But privatization would deprive the program of its 
defining characteristic: security. Social Security provides 
a guaranteed minimal retirement income to Americans. 
While it may not be generous, the benefit is totally pre­
dictable. It is, in brief, secure. While increased concerns 
may be appealing, moving Social Security into the pri­
vate market exposes vulnerable Americans to volatility 
that could prove devastating.
Another fundamental Social Security reform in­
volves the very basis of women’s retirement benefits. 
H istorically, women received benefits based on their 
marital status. With women’s increased labor force par­
ticipation this has resulted in the inequities described 
above. Clearly, the granddaughters of our target cohort 
will not tolerate a Social Security system that does not rec­
ognize their labor force participation. So the 21st century 
may see implementation of some form of earnings sharing. 
Indeed, Americans may go beyond earnings sharing to 
elimination of the spousal benefit. Many might share Fer- 
ber’s (1993) view that the “preferential treatment” afford­
ed through the spousal benefit can not be justified. Mar­
riage might ultimately not serve as the basis for women’s 
social security benefits. Benefits may be calculated for in­
dividuals, strictly on the basis of their contributions as la­
borers. Of course, without some accommodation, this 
would increase the already substantial cost of child-rear­
ing (see Kingson & O’Grady-LeShane, 1993).
Social security reforms might offset that cost by in­
corporating parenthood into benefit computations. Pro­
posals to offer social security credits for child-rearing
(and caregiving) have been advanced, and might become 
more attractive as Americans recognize the problems as­
sociated with low fertility. Paul Adams (1990) argued 
that recognizing the importance of child bearing might 
eliminate both child poverty and poverty among older 
women. European nations have adopted a variety of in­
novative measures, including child allowances, social se­
curity credit for children, and parental leaves (Adams, 
1990). These policies enhance the quality of life for chil­
dren and their families, and reduce the cost of childbear­
ing for women. They might also set the stage for broad­
er reforms in support of children.
An Agenda for 21 st Century Advocates
American enthusiasm for capitalism is unlikely to 
wane in the early decades of the 2 1 st century — nor is 
the nation’s distaste for anything that smacks of social­
ism. So European solutions, like family allowances and 
generous parental leave policies stand little chance of im­
plementation in the short run. Indeed, fundamental as­
pects of the nation’s safety net, like Social Security, are 
now threatened. The primary challenge for advocates 
who serve vulnerable Americans will be to sustain and 
improve the nation’s Social Security.
In the context of declining or low fertility, the finan­
cial stability of our social security system depends on 
maintaining a productive labor force. Each child repre­
sents a significant investment, and the nation cannot af­
ford to expose children to disease and poverty. Just as 
the system established in 1935 insured the elderly against 
these risks, the social security system designed in this 
century must insure children.
In the United States, as in the Titanic, the fates of 
women and children are inextricably linked. Advocacy 
goals for the new century must transcend generational 
boundaries. The notion that economic insecurity is a risk 
faced primarily in old age is belied by current child 
poverty statistics. The U.S. social insurance system must 
be redesigned to ensure both young and old Americans 
against the risk of poverty.
References
Achenbaum, A. (1986) Social Security: Visions and Revisions. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Adams, P. (1990). Children as contributions in kind: Social Security 
and family policy. Social W ork , 35(6), 492-498.
Barusch, A.S. (1994). Older Women in Poverty: Private lives and
574
Barusch • Social Security is not for Babies
public policies. New York: Springer.
Crystal, S. & Shea, D. (1990). Cumulative advantage, cumulative 
disadvantage, and inequality among elderly people. The 
Gerontologist, 30, 437-443.
Ferber, M.A. (1993). W omen’s employment and Social Security. So­
cial Security Bulletin, 56, 33- 55.
Fierst, E.U. & Duff, N (1988). Earnings sharing in Social Security: A 
model fo r  reform. (Report of the Technical committee on 
Earnings Sharing). Washington, DC: Center for W omen’s 
Policy Studies.
Gohmann, S.F., & McClure, J.E. (1987). Supreme Court rulings on 
pension plans: The effect on retirement age and wealth of 
single people. The Gerontologist, 27, 471-477.
Hayghe, H.V. (1997). Developments in W omen’s labor force partici­
pation, M onthly Labor Review , Sept., p. 41.
Joint Committee on Taxation (1998). Estimates o f Federal Tax E x­
penditures fo r  Fiscal Years 19992003 (JCS-7-98). GPO: De­
cember 14, 1998.
Kingson, E.R. & O-Grady-LeShane, R. (1993). The effects of care- 
giving on wom en’s Social Security benefits. The 
Gerontologist, 33, 230-239.
Kingson, E. & Quadagno, J. (1997). Social Security: M arketing rad­
ical reform. In R.B. Hudson (Ed.) The Future o f Age-Based 
Public Policy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Korczyk, S.M. (1993). Why has w om en’s pension coverage improved? 
Paper presented at the 1993 meetings of the Eastern Eco­
nomic Association.
McLeod, H.R. (1995). The sale of a generation. American Prospect, 
Spring.
N ational Center for Health Statistics (1998). Socioeconomic Status 
and Health Chartbook. (www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus98.pdf - 
accessed 6/23/00)
Office of Management and Budget (1999). Analytical Perspectives 
o f Budget o f the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2000. 
W ashington, DC: GPO.
O ’Grady-LeShane, R. (1995). Economic status of older African
American women: Implications for Social Security reform. 
African American Research Perspectives, Spring, 1995, 
(www.isr.umich.edu/rcgd/prba/persp/sp95/economic.html - 
accessed 7/5/00)
Quadagno, J. (1990). Generational equity and the politics of the 
welfare state. International Journal o f Health Services, 
20(4),631-649.
Schultz, J. (1995). The Economics o f Aging. Sixth Ed. Westport, CT: 
Auburn House.
Simpson, P. (1985, October). If the wage system doesn’t work, fix 
it. Working Women, 118-159.
Smeeding, T. Torrey, B.B., & Rainwater, L. (1993). Going to ex­
tremes: A n international perspective on the economic status o f
the U.S. aged. Conference paper. Feb, 1993.
Smith, K.E. & Bachu, A. (1999). W om en’s labor force attachment 
patterns and maternity leave: A review o f the literature. Popu­
lation Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census, W ashington D.C. 
working Paper No. 32. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current 
Population Reports, Series P-60.
Social Security Administration (1998). Figures:
www.ssa.gov/OACJ/TR/TR98/index.html accessed 
11/30/98).
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1999). Statistical Abstract o f the United 
States: 1999. (www.census.gov/statab - accessed 5/5/00)
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1991). Characteristics o f  the Population 
Below Poverty. Series p-60. Washington, DC: GPO.
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1991a). Educational Attainment in the 
United States: March 1988 and 1989. Series P-20, no. 451. 
Washington, DC: GPO.
U.S. Department of Commerce (1935, 1950). Statistical Abstract o f 
the United States. Washington, DC: GPO.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (1992). Income o f 
the aged chart book, 1990. Washington, D.C.: GPO.
U.S. Department of Labor (2000). Highlights o f  W om en’s Earnings 
in 1999. Report 943. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
(www.bls.gov/pdf/cpswom99.pdf - accessed 5/5/00)
U.S. General Accounting Office (1992, Feb.). Pension plans: Sur­
vivor benefit coverage fo r  wives increased after 1984 pension 
law . (Report to the Chairman, Sub-committee on Retirement 
Income and Employment, Select Committee on Aging, House 
of Representatives, GAO/HRD-92-49). Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office.
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means
(1985). Report on earnings sharing implementation study 
(Feb. 14, 1986, committee print). Washington, DC: Govern­
ment Printing Office.
Woods, J.R. (1989). Pension coverage among private wage and
salary workers: Preliminary findings from the 1988 Survey 
of Employee Benefits. Social Security Bulletin, 52, 2-19.
*Source: National Center for Health Statistics, 1998
Source: Smith & Bachu, 1999; U.S. Department of Commerce, 1935 - 1990
Amanda Smith Barusch is Professor, Graduate School o f Social Work, 
University o f Utah, 395 South 1500 East, Room 111, Salt Lake City, UT 
84112-0260.
Original manuscript received: June 12, 2000 
Revised: July 12, 2000 
Accepted: July 18, 2000
575
